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Abstract 
This paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy quickly moved 
from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to, essentially, only publishing analytic 
philosophy. Further, the changes at the journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the 
journals Mind and The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist philosophy 
journals in Britain and America during the period 1925-1969. The pattern is one in which journals 
controlled by analytic philosophers systematically promote a form of critical philosophy and 
marginalise rival approaches to philosophy. This pattern, it is argued, helps to explain the growing 
dominance of analytic philosophy during the twentieth century and allows characterising this form 
of philosophy as, at least during 1925-1969, a sectarian form of critical philosophy. 
Keywords: analytic philosophy, history of philosophy, American philosophy, British philosophy.  
1. Introduction 
The present paper argues that analytic philosophy, at least during the period 1925-1969, 
was a form of critical philosophy that used institutional control in order to promote itself 
and marginalise rivals. This institutional control, it will further be argued, partly explains the 
emergence and eventual dominance of analytic philosophy in Great Britain and the United 
States of America. More specifically, already documented takeovers of the journals Mind 
and The Philosophical Review (PR) by analytic philosophers (Katzav and Vaesen 2017a and 
2017b) are here shown to be part of a pattern. The pattern is of philosophers with a shared 
commitment to a form of critical philosophy either (a) founding journals that are dedicated 
to promoting that form of critical philosophy or (b) using journals with a history of openness 
to diverse philosophical approaches to promote that form of critical philosophy at the 
expense of rivals. It is this use of journals which, in turn, plays a role in explaining the 
emergence and dominance of analytic philosophy. 
I provide evidence for the above mentioned pattern by examining the changing 
contents of philosophy journals and trying to learn about the causes of these changes from 
the composition of journal editorial boards. In section 2, I outline the classification system I 
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use in classifying journal papers. Following earlier work of mine with Krist Vaesen (2017a 
and 2017b), this system divides philosophical approaches in America and Britain into 
speculative and critical ones, with, e.g., classical pragmatism, absolute idealism and process 
philosophy being classified as speculative and analytic philosophy being classified as critical. 
Importantly for what follows, phenomenology and existentialism will be taken to have 
critical and speculative variants. 
Section 3 presents a classification of the contents of The Journal of Philosophy (JoP) 
during the period 1950-1969. We will see that its contents change in two stages. The first 
change occurs in 1958, when JoP goes from being a pluralist journal, i.e., one that is open to 
the various forms of speculative and critical philosophy available in America at the time, to 
being a journal that, although still open to existentialism and phenomenology, was focused 
on a form of critical philosophy, namely mid-century analytic philosophy. The 1958 change 
only impacts the pages of the journal in 1962, for reasons that will become clear. The 
second change is the exclusion of phenomenology and existentialism from JoP after 1963. 
As we will see, the two shifts in JoP’s contents are attributable to two changes in its 
management. The first change in management is the appointment of Robert D. Cumming – 
whose work was in the history of phenomenology and existentialism – as journal editor. The 
second change is the appointment of the analytic philosophers Arthur C. Danto, Sydney 
Morgenbesser and James J. Walsh as journal editors in 1964.  
Section 4 situates the occurrences at JoP, and the similar occurrences at Mind and 
PR, in a broader context. I provide, in less detail than was done for JoP, an overview of the 
contents of what can be viewed as the ‘generalist’ philosophy journals operating in America 
and Britain during the 1940s and 1950s, that is, of philosophy journals that then catered to 
most of the specialisations in subject matter of academic philosophers in these countries. 
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The journals include, in addition to the three already mentioned journals, Analysis, 
Philosophical Studies (PS), Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (PPR), 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (PAS), The Philosophical Quarterly (PQ) and The 
Review of Metaphysics (RM). Relevant journals which were founded in the 1960s are also 
covered, including American Philosophical Quarterly (APQ), The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy (SJP) and Noûs. The overview illustrates the founding of analytic philosophy only 
journals by analytic philosophers (APQ, Analysis, Noûs, PS), the use of control of historically 
pluralist journals in order to marginalise non-analytic philosophy (Mind, PR, JoP and PQ), 
and the continued existence of (generalist) pluralist journals after 1950 only under the 
management of non-analytic philosophers (SJP, JoP prior to 1958, PQ prior to 1957, PPR 
until 1980 and RM). The overview also allows an understanding of the limited journal 
publication options available to non-analytic philosophers in the late 1940s, the 1950s and 
the 1960s, and a consideration of how these options contributed to the growth of analytic 
philosophy. Finally, the overview allows considering other candidate contributors to this  
growth, including contributors that, like those uncovered here, are primarily independent of 
argumentation (external contributors) and those that are not independent in this way 
(internal contributors). With regard to external contributors, I provide evidence for thinking 
that McCarthyism had a limited role in driving the growth of analytic philosophy. With 
regard to internal contributors, my discussion suggests that there was no adequate 
justification for the sectarian attitudes found in analytic philosophy in the decades during 
which it came to dominance in Britain and America. 
In section 5, I discuss what the examination of journal contents, and the way in 
which analytic philosophy became dominant in Britain and America, might teach us about 
the nature of analytic philosophy. I consider the form of critical philosophy that analytic 
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philosophy was, how its attitude to other approaches to philosophy might have been 
underpinned by a commitment to critical philosophy and whether it was also characterised 
by dogmatism about philosophical approach, that is, by a level of commitment to its 
approach that was not justified by available evidence or argumentation. The conclusion, in 
section 6, summarises my claims about the growth and nature of analytic philosophy, and 
relates these claims to alternative pictures of analytic philosophy. 
 
2. Classifying British and American philosophy during the period 1925-1969 
According to Katzav and Vaesen (2017a, p. 774), the distinction between speculative and 
critical philosophy is the most fundamental distinction between approaches to philosophy 
made by authors in PR in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. The same is true of authors writing 
elsewhere in Britain and America during this period (see, e.g., Stedman (1938), Reichenbach 
(1951), Collins (1951), Dewey (1956) and Lowe (1958)). Speculative philosophy, as 
understood at the time, tends to focus on the provision of substantial, general claims about 
the natures of the universe and its human occupants. Moreover, it provides such claims in a 
way that is epistemically independent of established beliefs, including those of science and 
common sense. Critical philosophy tends to avoid making claims that are independent in 
this way and, instead, tends to describe or make explicit/reconstruct the commitments of 
existing, established beliefs. Speculative philosophies will tend to include a critical 
philosophy as a component. 
The methodologies associated with speculative philosophy include developing views 
of reality on the basis of a priori principles, dialectical investigation that takes its starting 
point from common sense and science but that goes beyond both, and observation based 
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theorising. The methodologies associated with critical philosophy are the varieties of 
analysis, including epistemological, linguistic and logical analysis. In addition, speculative 
philosophy is thought of as being, unlike analytic philosophy, inherently concerned with 
drawing practical and normative conclusions. 
While Katzav and Vaesen (2017a) only explicitly characterise critical and speculative 
approaches to philosophy in terms of tendencies to make certain types of claims, these 
approaches can also be characterised in terms of views about how philosophy should be 
done. Authors in PR, JoP and elsewhere (see, e.g., de Laguna (1951), Frankena (1951) and 
the references in the previous paragraph) make it clear that, according to speculative 
philosophy, philosophy should provide its own distinctive substantive claims. Similarly, 
according to critical philosophy, philosophy should avoid going beyond established belief. 
Speculative philosophical approaches were, during the period under consideration, 
taken to include absolute idealism, classical – that is, Peircean, Jamesian and Deweyan – 
pragmatism, process philosophy, Thomism, (some variants of) neo-Kantian philosophy and 
more. Critical philosophy was taken to include new and critical realism, logical positivism, 
and early and mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy. Mid-twentieth century analytic 
philosophy differs from its analytic predecessor primarily by being broader; by mid-
twentieth century, analytic philosophy incorporates ordinary language philosophy, the ideas 
of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, and ideas from logical positivism and pragmatism.  
  A complication that matters to what follows concerns the classification of 
phenomenology and existentialism in America of the 1950s and 1960s. Katzav and Vaesen 
(2017a, p. 775) follow writers in PR and classify these approaches as speculative. This 
perspective is supported by James M. Edie’s 1964 survey of what was then recent work in 
American phenomenology. He characterizes American phenomenology as “aiming to 
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contribute to a foundational study of man and, in doing so, going ‘beneath’ the "objectivistic" 
categories introduced from the natural sciences” (1964, p. 116). However, some 
phenomenologists during the period we are concerned with do think that philosophy should 
be a purely critical enterprise. Thus, for example, Marvin Farber, the founder of PPR, is critical 
of the phenomenological movement on the whole and, indeed, thinks (Kim 1989) that what 
is of value in Edmund Husserl’s philosophy is a critical methodology, namely the method of 
eidetic analysis and description. 
 As we will see, some critical work that was neither phenomenological nor existentialist 
had a real place in JoP in the 1950s but not after about 1963. This work included, for example, 
work in modern Indian philosophy and will be classified as non-analytic (at least by 1960s 
standards). My motivation here is the relative absence of the work from the journal after 1963 
and the work’s sympathy for what were then, from the journal’s perspective, non-standard 
forms of analysis or unfashionable, including speculative, authors. 
 
3. The Journal of Philosophy: 1950–1969 
3.1. 1950–1961: pluralism 
JoP’s contents during the period 1950-1961 nicely illustrate the above classification of 
approaches to philosophy into critical and speculative varieties. During these years, work in 
critical philosophy in JoP includes (work standardly classified as) analytic philosophy, but 
extends to critical work in phenomenology and existentialism; critical, including analytic, 
contributions to the journal are also made by speculative philosophers. Speculative 
philosophy appears regularly in the journal and does so in a variety of forms. These include 
classical pragmatism, absolute idealism, process philosophy, speculative phenomenology, 
speculative existentialism, Thomism and eclectic approaches. In terms of diversity, JoP in 
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this period is similar to PR in the 1940s, though some important differences exist. Most 
notably, as Katzav and Vaesen note (2017a, p. 781), classical pragmatism is the most 
prominent form of speculative philosophy in JoP of the 1950s, but is not so in PR of the 
1930s and 1940s. 
Analytic contributions in JoP include ordinary language philosophy (e.g., Ambrose 
(1952) and Ebersole (1956)) and logical empiricism (e.g., Nagel (1953) and Feigl (1958)), but 
also a variety of other analytic approaches, as is seen in the criticism of ordinary language 
philosophy’s methods and results (e.g., Chisholm (1952) and Danto (1958)). 
Methodologically, while much analytic philosophy in the journal focuses on analysing 
language usage, other work involves, among other things, conceptual analysis and 
reconstruction (e.g., Putnam (1957) and Chisholm (1961)) and epistemological analysis (e.g., 
Kyburg Jr. (1956) and Wellman (1961)). 
Classical pragmatist work in JoP of the 1950s and early 1960s does exhibit the 
speculative tendency to develop its own perspective about people and the world. For 
example, Parsons (1961) argues for a Deweyan, speculative methodology for the philosophy 
of religion and Suits (1961) argues for the viability of aspects of Dewey’s speculative 
philosophy of nature. Pragmatist papers do, however, often have a critical focus (e.g., 
Bernstein (1961)). Particularly prominent is Deweyan pragmatism (see the references just 
provided), but pragmatist papers also draw on Charles S. Peirce (e.g., Murphree (1959)), 
George H. Mead (e.g., Natanson (1953)) and George Santayana (e.g., Corey (1950)), among 
others. 
Non-pragmatist speculative papers in the journal include papers that are influenced 
by Alfred N. Whitehead (e.g., Hartshorne (1955) and Bakan (1958)), absolute idealism (e.g., 
Cotton (1956)), Thomism (e.g., Mourant (1957)) and other less familiar speculative 
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philosophical approaches (e.g., Krikorian (1955), Pepper (1956) and Doan (1956)). Non-
pragmatist speculative papers also include work in phenomenology and existentialism, as 
we will see. 
In addition, the tie between speculative approaches and practical concerns is 
something that is recognised regularly (e.g., Gray (1952) and Burtt (1960)). Papers with 
concrete normative implications are also to be found, and these are rarely by analytic 
philosophers. Particularly notable papers with concrete normative implications include 
three from 1951 and 1952, one of which is by the pragmatist Sydney Hook, one by the 
critical realist Arthur O. Lovejoy and one by the process philosopher Victor Lowe. Hook and 
Lovejoy argue that members of the communist party are, as such, disqualified from being 
professors in academia, and Lowe criticises the position taken by Hook and Lovejoy (see 
Capps (2003) for more on the exchange). 
Papers that are not in phenomenology or existentialism, but do focus on these 
approaches, often sympathetically, regularly appear in JoP (e.g., Gray (1952) and Seyppel 
(1953)). So do papers in existentialism and/or phenomenology (e.g., Wild (1952), Tillich 
(1956) and Champigny (1957), which includes work by Jean-Paul Sartre). In the early 1960s, 
some phenomenology in JoP is speculative (see appendix I) while some argues that 
phenomenology should be a critical enterprise (Farber (1962), Gurwitsch (1961) and Schmitt 
(1962)). 
Some JoP papers engage with the history of Western philosophy and/or with a wide 
variety of then contemporary approaches to philosophy (e.g., Sommers (1952) and Smith 
(1958)). In addition, some volumes showcase what was then contemporary European 
philosophy (e.g., the special edition on Polish philosophy (57(7)) and the edition that 
contains the already mentioned work by Sartre). However, work in non-Western philosophy 
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does not appear in JoP; by contrast, Katzav and Vaesen (2017a, p. 777) document such work 
in pre-1950s PR. Indeed, the vast majority of JoP authors write from America, though some 
were modern Indian philosophers who were located in India and whose papers were in 
critical philosophy (e.g., Krishna (1956), Raju (1958) and Devaraja (1959)). 
Specialist areas of philosophy which are represented in the journal include the 
philosophy of science, the philosophy of economics, political philosophy, the philosophy of 
psychology, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of history, the history of philosophy, 
epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, metaphilosophy and more.  
 
3.2. 1962–1969: two abrupt changes 
JoP’s contents change quickly after 1961. During the period 1950-1960, the non-analytic, 
non-historical (i.e., non-analytic, critical and speculative) papers in the journal on any given 
year comprise roughly between 40% and 50% of the journal’s papers1, with almost all of the 
rest of the papers in the year being analytic papers. Roughly 70% or more of the non-
analytic, non-historical papers in any given year were speculative; there were sixteen such 
papers in 1955 and twenty one in 1956. In 1961, the journal still publishes nineteen papers 
which can be classified as speculative. There are five further papers which can be classified 
as non-analytic, critical papers. In total, this amounts to about 40% of the papers in the 
journal in that year (see Appendix I). In 1962, however, there is one paper which can be 
classified as speculative and another two which can be classified as critical, non-analytic 
papers. The non-analytic, non-historical papers in this year are approximately 5% of the 
                                                          
1 My estimate is based on the percentages of non-analytic, non-historical papers in 1955 (≈40%) and 1956 
(≈50%), years which seem to contain, respectively, relatively low and relatively high numbers of non-analytic, 
non-historical papers. Note that here, and in what follows, I am referring to full-length papers, including 
contributions to American Philosophical Association symposia. 
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papers in the journal (see Appendix I). In 1963, about 20% of the papers are non-analytic, 
non-historical papers and in 1964, about 10% (see Appendix I). The years 1965-1969 are akin 
to 1962, with non-analytic, non-historical content at about 5%; 1965, for example, only 
includes two papers that might be classified as non-analytic (see Appendix I). Analytic 
papers during this period come to comprise almost all that JoP publishes. One thing that 
does not change during the late 1950s and, at least, the first half of the 1960s is the nature 
of analytic philosophy in JoP; it is aptly termed mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy. 
 Phenomenology and existentialism appears to maintain its presence in JoP until 
1963, but basically comes to be excluded from the journal from 1964. During 1964-1967, for 
example, only two papers in the journal (both of which are critical papers and appear in 
1965) might be classified as phenomenological or existentialist in their approach. By 
contrast, nine papers can be classified as either phenomenological or existentialist during 
1961-1963, including five speculative papers (see Appendix I). 
The journal also ceases – much as PR did when it became an analytic journal a 
decade earlier (Katzav and Vaesen 2017a, p. 778) and Mind more or less did after 1926 
when it became hostile to speculative thought (Katzav 2017) – to publish papers by 
philosophers in India; this occurred despite the fact that the JoP papers these philosophers 
published in the 1950s were critical and, indeed, were neither phenomenological nor 
existentialist. Plausibly, the work was still not close enough to mid-twentieth century 
analytic philosophy for 1960s JoP. Thus, for example, Daya Krishna’s 1956 paper is a 
contribution to linguistic philosophy, but would stand out in post-1961 JoP because it 
appeals to the cultural context of language in analysing meanings (similar considerations 
apply to, e.g., Devaraja (1959)). 
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Not surprisingly, which individuals publish in JoP also changes in the early 1960s. In 
particular, some speculative philosophers whose publishing careers extend well after 1962-
1963 and who publish in JoP regularly prior to these years, cease to do so in later years. 
Examples include Gail Kennedy, Max Rieser and John Wild (Appendix I provides references 
to some of their JoP work). 
 
3.3. Proximate causes of the changes at The Journal of Philosophy 
Given the speed of the changes at JoP, they must have been driven by editorial policies. A 
note by Danto marking the death of Cumming in 2004 helps to identify the policies’ authors. 
Danto writes: 
[A]ll of us have reason to be grateful to Bob for his service as editor of the Journal, from 
1958-1964, for it was he who took the steps necessary to transform it into the important 
journal of professional philosophy that it became through his measures. Bob inherited an 
immense backlog of papers that had been accepted in an act of recklessness by one of his 
predecessors, and he insisted that until all this was published, no further papers could be 
accepted. When space had at last been made for new contributions, he imposed the highest 
standards, using prompt publication as an incentive. When the level he deemed suitable was 
attained, he withdrew, leaving the publication in the hands of younger philosophers. 
Interestingly, he had no particular interest in the kind of professional analytical paper 
through which the Journal made its reputation. His philosophical tastes and values were 
entirely Continental, and his heroes were Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty 
(2004, p. 607). 
 
If Danto is correct about who controlled the content of JoP during the years 1958-1964, then 
it is plausible to suppose that Cumming was responsible for the standards by which JoP papers 
were judged during these years and thus was responsible for the changes that then occurred 
in the journal. This fits with JoP’s front matter; it tells us that Cumming was editor from 1958 
until June 1964 (Vol. 61(13)). The moratorium decided upon by Cumming thus also went along 
with a decision that – with the exception of speculative existentialist and speculative 
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phenomenological work – basically excluded accepting speculative papers for publication in 
JoP. Although the moratorium meant that this decision only became visible in 1962, it was 
presumably made in 1958. The front matter also reveals that the younger philosophers who 
were on the editorial board from 1964 were Sidney Morgenbesser, Arthur Danto and James 
J. Walsh. It thus seems that these three were responsible for maintaining the changes initiated 
by Cumming and for further narrowing down the focus of the journal in 1964, including 
effectively excluding phenomenology and existentialism from the journal.  
 Attributing responsibility for JoP content from 1964 onwards to Danto and 
Morgenbesser fits well with their analytic approach to philosophy (see, e.g., Danto (1958 
and 1963) and Morgenbesser (1969) respectively). Walsh was primarily a historian of 
medieval philosophy, but his non-historical work (e.g., Walsh (1963)) reveals a clear analytic 
orientation. Things are more complex when it comes to Cumming. He too was primarily a 
historian of philosophy. But, as Danto notes, Cumming’s work was on, and his sympathies 
were with, phenomenology and existentialism. Why, then, did he help to promote analytic 
philosophy at the expense of speculative philosophy? Most plausibly, Cumming shared the 
already noted opposition to speculative philosophy that was prominent among some of 
those working in phenomenology. Indeed, although the historical nature of Cumming’s late 
1950s work makes his approach to philosophy at the time hard to discern, his focus was on 
the work of Søren A. Kierkegaard and Sartre, and he pits these thinkers against a 
“disintegrating philosophical tradition” that has Hegel – whose work is central to much 
Anglo-American speculative philosophy – as its pivotal figure (1955, p. 98). Another 
possibility is that the young philosophers who officially took over the journal in 1964 already 
had substantial influence on the journal prior to 1964; this possibility is in tension with 
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Danto’s letter but fits the fact that analytic philosophy was the primary beneficiary of the 
1962 changes in JoP. 
 Three other philosophers were, according to JoP’s front matter, among its editors in 
1958. Since all three were editors prior to 1964, Danto’s letter suggests that they were not 
involved in driving the changes in JoP’s contents. Indeed, it is independently implausible 
that they were. George L. Kline, whose role as editor is coextensive with that of Cumming, 
was a speculative philosopher (see, e.g., Kline (1961)). The remaining two editors were 
Herbert W. Schneider and John H. Randall Jr. Both had been editors throughout the 1950s 
and thus are unlikely to have participated in initiating the changes in the journal. Further, 
Schneider ceases to be recognised as an editor in 1962, precisely when the character of the 
journal is visibly transformed. Schneider is also a speculative philosopher (see, e.g., 
Schneider (1949)). Randall Jr. does continue to be named as an editor until the end of 1966; 
at that point, his editorial position comes to be described as honorary. But he is a 
speculative philosopher with little respect for analytic philosophy (see, e.g., Randall Jr. 
(1956)). 
 Finally, Danto claims that Cumming was responsible for an improvement in the 
quality of the papers in JoP as well as for making the journal’s reputation. But an 
improvement in the reputation of JoP in the 1960s would, at most, make sense from the 
perspective of analytic philosophers; JoP was the most prominent journal still open to non-
analytic philosophers in the 1950s and among the three most prominent journals in America 
and Britain (see section 4). As for the claim that the standard of work in the journal 
improved in the early 1960s, this is perhaps correct by the mid-twentieth century standards 
of analytic philosophy. Yet these standards were clearly in dispute between non-analytic 
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and analytic approaches to philosophy. I consider what justification there might have been 
for preferring the standards of analytic philosophy below. 
 
4. The contents of generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America (1925-1969), 
and the effects of these contents 
There is evidence (Katzav and Vaesen 2017b) that analytic editors by and large exclude non-
analytic philosophy from Mind from roughly 1925 onwards; a notable exception was made 
for new and critical realism while it still had force in the 1930s. There is also evidence 
(Katzav and Vaesen 2017a) that analytic editors basically excluded non-analytic philosophy 
from PR from 1948 onwards.  Section 3 allows adding that, plausibly, JoP closed its doors to 
non-analytic philosophy in 1958, even if this only became visible in its pages in 1962. Thus, 
by the end of the 1950s, the three most prominent philosophy journals in Britain and 
America were dedicated to analytic philosophy.2 
 Katzav and Vaesen (2017a) also note that the changes in PR probably pushed young 
academics in the direction of analytic philosophy at a time when there was substantial 
growth in American philosophy.3 Presumably, the changes in JoP and the established 
sectarian attitudes at Mind enhanced this effect. Partly, the effect is likely to have been a 
direct result of the prestige of the involved journals; what they presented to young 
philosophers was a world of philosophy which, by and large, identified serious philosophy 
                                                          
2 Support for assuming the mid-twentieth century prominence of Mind, PR and JoP is provided by Katzav and 
Vaesen (2017a, p. 773) as well as by considering which established, generalist philosophy journals were 
available at the time. As what follows makes clear, PPR was, leaving aside the relatively lightweight Philosophy, 
the only other established, generalist journal in Britain and America of the 1950s which published non-invited, 
full-length papers. PPR, however, was only founded in 1940 and had a base in a niche in American philosophy, 
namely phenomenology. This suggests that the journal had comparatively limited influence. 
3 The membership of the American Philosophical Association rose from 1248 in 1950 to 2725 in 1970 (Soames, 
2008). Taking this growth rate to reflect the overall growth rate in the number of American academic 
philosophers implies that the number of academic philosophers in 1970 was roughly 2.2 the number in 1950. 
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with analytic philosophy. In addition, however, the end of the Second World War saw a 
period during which publishing became important to getting and keeping an academic 
position (Nee and Ingram 1998).  
 In order to get a more complete picture of the impact of the kind of sectarianism 
found at Mind, PR and JoP, we need to examine the contents of other generalist journals in 
Britain and America. I do so first by focusing on the period 1940-1959 and then, more 
briefly, on the period 1960-1969. In Britain of the 1940s and 1950s, the only established, 
generalist academic philosophy journals other than Mind were Analysis, Philosophy and 
PAS.4 Analysis, which was founded in 1930, was an analytic philosophy only journal from the 
outset. PAS only published papers annually and thus provided relatively little space. In 
addition, its papers were invited and were, by the 1950s, dominated by analytic philosophy 
(see the abstracts compiled by John W. Scott (1960)). Philosophy was, during the period 
under consideration, open to non-analytic philosophy, but it was founded in 1926 by the 
British Institute of Philosophical Studies – later named the Royal Institute of Philosophy – 
partly in order to bring philosophy to a wide audience (see the editorial statement in vol. 
1(1)). As a result, its articles were relatively popular and short; plausibly, it was not the place 
to establish an academic reputation.  
PQ was founded in 1950 by the speculative philosopher Thomas M. Knox and was 
then open to speculative philosophy (Katzav and Vaesen 2017a) and to analytic philosophy. 
However, PQ was not an established journal in the early 1950s. Moreover, its pluralism 
about philosophical approach was short-lived. The ordinary language philosopher Anthony 
D. Woozley (see, e.g., Woozley (1953)) assists Knox in editing the journal in 1956 and 
                                                          
4 Here, and in what follows, claims about which generalist journals were available are based on International 
Directory of Philosophy and Philosophers (1965) and The Directory of American Philosophers (1972), along with 
a consideration of journal contents. 
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becomes the journal’s editor in 1957 (see PQ’s front matter for these years); the journal is 
basically an analytic only philosophy journal from 1957. Ratio was a British-German journal 
founded in 1957 under the editorship of Julius Kraft, but it published relatively few papers in 
its first decade – e.g., it only published fifteen papers during 1957-1959 – and (Hacohen 
2000, p. 121) was an anti-Hegelian journal that aimed to promote critical philosophy, in a 
Kantian sense of ‘critical philosophy’.5 
 In America, PPR of the 1950s was a relatively established venue for publication, 
albeit one that was not as prestigious as Mind, PR or JoP. Moreover, while PPR was the 
organ of the International Phenomenological Society and did place particular emphasis on 
work in phenomenology and existentialism, it published speculative philosophy that was 
neither phenomenological nor existentialist as well as analytic philosophy; it also catered to 
a wide range of areas of specialisation within philosophy. It can thus plausibly be viewed as 
a venue that was generalist. 
 The only other American venues which might be thought of as generalist were PS 
and RM. But PS was dedicated to analytic philosophy from its founding in 1950. RM was, by 
contrast, pluralistic and particularly open to non-analytic, including speculative, philosophy. 
Yet, RM was established in 1947 and thus was a fledgling journal for some of the period at 
hand. Building a reputation for a pluralistic journal at a time during which the main players 
were predominantly analytic would have been hard, though RM’s base at Yale (Castiglione 
2005) could have somewhat compensated for this. 
 In summary, during the period 1949-1959, non-analytic philosophy was allowed 
substantial space only in two established generalist, American journals, i.e., JoP and PPR – 
                                                          
5 The Hibbert Journal was British and did provide limited room for philosophy, including speculative 
philosophy, but it had a much broader focus than philosophy or academic research, and ceased publication in 
1956. 
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and only one of these (JoP) was among the three most prominent journals in America and 
Britain. This space – not much more than the equivalent of one journal – was supplemented 
by space in the fledgling RM. The destinations for non-analytic philosophy are further 
reduced after the 1958 changes in JoP. In Britain, Philosophy and PQ had space for non-
analytic philosophy, but PQ was a fledgling journal the pluralism of which only lasted until 
1957, and Philosophy was a relatively lightweight journal. On the other hand, analytic 
philosophy had, throughout the period being considered, virtually all of Mind, PR, Analysis 
and PS to itself (though note the thinness of the volumes of the last two of these journals) 
as well as substantial room in JoP, PPR, RM, PQ and Philosophy; in the late 1950s, PQ 
became an analytic journal and analytic philosophers are likely to have learnt of what was 
brewing at JoP (see Table 1 for the situation in 1959). Restrictions on journal space thus 
placed very substantial limits on the visibility, prestige and publication of non-analytic 
philosophy and helped to push philosophers in the direction of analytic philosophy. 
Journal Analytic Non-analytic 
Mind +   
The Philosophical Review +   
The Journal of Philosophy + 
 
Analysis +    
The Philosophical Quarterly +  
 
Philosophy +  + 
Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 
+  
Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 
+ + 
The Review of Metaphysics + +  
Philosophical Studies + (1950-)   
Table 1: Generalist, academic philosophy journals in America and Britain and their 
openness to publishing analytic and non-analytic papers (1959). 
 The 1960s did not see a reversal in the sectarianism of the journals that were, by the 
end of the 1950s, focused on analytic philosophy. To be sure, one generalist, pluralist 
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journal, namely SJP, is founded in 1964, early enough in the 1960s to have an impact on the 
trajectory of philosophy during this decade. But SJP was not only a fledgling journal, it was 
also open to analytic philosophy and provided very limited space in comparison with what 
was already available in sectarian journals at the time. A second generalist journal, APQ, is 
founded in 1964, but it only occasionally publishes non-analytic philosophy. 
Let me make five more points before concluding this section. First, the sectarian 
attitudes at Mind, PR and JoP were part of a pattern. Generalist journals under the control 
of analytic editors in America and Britain are, during the period under consideration, 
essentially only open to analytic philosophy. The changing contents of PQ fit this pattern, as 
do the prominent analytic editors, and corresponding contents, of Analysis and PS (Analysis 
is edited by Margaret MacDonald during 1948-1956, and PS’s founding editors are Herbert 
Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars). APQ’s founding occurs before its editor, Nicholas Rescher, moves 
away from analytic philosophy (Rescher 1982, pp. 161-162). Noûs too (contrary to its front 
matter) was dedicated to analytic philosophy from its founding under the editorship of 
Hector-Neri Castañeda – an analytic philosopher (Rapaport 2005) – in 1967. RM and PPR 
remain open to a variety of philosophical approaches, but their editors are not analytic 
philosophers. RM is founded by Weiss, who was a speculative philosopher (Castiglione 
2005) and who remains editor there until 1964, when another speculative philosopher, 
Bernstein, takes over the journal (Hogan 2005). Farber edits PPR from its founding in 1940 
until his death in 1980, when the journal is taken over by the analytic philosopher Roderick 
Chisholm (Chisholm 1986); under Chisholm, non-analytic philosophy has a token presence in 
the journal, often in the form of exegetical work on Husserl or Heidegger.6 SJP’s founding 
                                                          
6 Chisholm writes, “I had told Farber that I would try to make the journal conform to the original plans he had 
had in founding it. I took this to mean that it would be especially receptive to the kinds of philosophical 
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editor is William B. Barton Jr., a speculative philosopher (see, e.g., Barton Jr. 1964). And 
while my focus has been on pre-1970s generalist journals, the case of PPR suggests that, at 
least to some extent, the pattern described here continued beyond the 1960s (to offer a 
further potential illustration, The Personalist, which was renamed Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly in 1980, appears quickly to have transitioned into an analytic philosophy 
dominated journal in the early 1970s, after it came to be edited by the analytic philosopher 
John Hospers (Rasmussen 1988) in 1968. Takeovers of at least some specialist journals also 
occurred. Don A. Howard shows (2003) that Philosophy of Science becomes a journal for 
analytic philosophy of science when it is taken over by the logical empiricist Richard Rudner 
in 1959. 
Second, Katzav and Vaesen (2017a) suggest that, in the case of the takeover of PR, 
speculative philosophers’ pluralism about philosophical approach may partly explain why 
analytic philosophers were given editorial roles. The broader picture provided above 
suggests that pluralism may have also had a stage-setting role at other American journals. 
As we have seen, pluralist journals (in America and Britain) did not, prior to being taken over 
by analytic philosophers, generally exclude work in analytic philosophy from their pages. 
Nor did they exclude analytic philosophers from participating in the editorial process. Thus, 
JoP’s front matter tells us that the analytic philosopher Ernest Nagel served as one of its 
editors during the period 1939-1956. PR had the analytic philosopher Richard Robinson as 
an editor in the 1940s while it was still a pluralist journal (Katzav and Vaesen, 2017a, p. 783). 
Now, the openness of speculative philosophers could in principle help to explain why 
analytic philosophers got in through the door. And the sectarian attitude of relevant analytic 
                                                          
question that have been emphasized by philosophers in the tradition of Brentano and Husserl and that the 
journal should be primarily concerned with philosophy and not with other disciplines” (1986, p. 13). 
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philosophers would then help to explain why, once they had sufficient control, they let 
nobody else in. 
Third, in addition to sectarianism at philosophy journals, sectarianism in teaching at 
PhD-awarding philosophy departments and in hiring philosophers (independently of their 
records of publication) is likely to have substantially affected the trajectory of philosophy in 
Britain and America. It is clear, for example, that a number of prominent American PhD-
awarding departments came quickly to be dominated by analytic philosophers during the 
late 1940s and the 1950s, including, among others, the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell 
University (Katzav and Vaesen 2017a), the philosophy department at UCLA (McCumber 
2016) and the philosophy department at Harvard (Soames 2008). This, plausibly, would have 
reduced the willingness of the departments in question to hire non-analytic philosophers as 
well as steered PhD students at these schools in the direction of analytic philosophy. Similar 
effects have been document at the University of Oxford after the Second World War 
(Akehurst 2011). 
Fourth, Katzav and Vaesen (2017a) observe that the takeover of PR by analytic 
philosophers in the late 1940s predates the main pressures of the McCarthy era, and thus 
that it – along with any tension that might have existed between it and practice oriented 
speculative philosophy – is not a plausible explanation for these changes. The changes at JoP 
also do not seem to be explained by an appeal to McCarthyism. They begin in 1958, which is 
already after the height of the McCarthy era, and are implemented and reinforced in the 
1960s. Indeed, we have seen that analytic philosophy’s sectarianism continues throughout 
the 1960s in a wide variety of American venues, as well as that it extended to Britain. This 
suggests that the changes in America depended on less local factors than McCarthyism (cf. 
Hollinger (2002)). In addition, speculative American philosophy continued to be prominent 
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in American philosophy during the McCarthy era. Perhaps this was because speculative 
philosophy could steer away from practical issues that might have then been viewed with 
suspicion, perhaps because (recall the case of Hook) it could fit comfortably with 
McCarthyism and perhaps because (recall Lowe’s criticism of Hook) McCarthyism was 
limited in its influence.  
Finally, my investigation of journal contents, and associated non-journal literature, 
suggests that there was no case that might justify the sectarianism I have been describing. 
One does find some direct criticism of speculative philosophy as such during the period 
1920-1960 (e.g., Ayer (1934), Carnap (1935, ch. 1), Ryle (1937), Stace (1943), Reichenbach 
(1951) and Hampshire (1960)). Moreover, speculative philosophers do repeatedly respond 
to this criticism (e.g., Stedman (1938), Pepper (1942), Emmet (1946), Hahn (1952), Harris 
(1952) and Blanshard (1966)). However, these responses are not, as far as I can tell, 
addressed by the criticism of speculative philosophy. There thus does not appear to be even 
the beginning of an extended exchange between approaches to philosophy that might 
justify a sectarian form of critical philosophy. 
Let me illustrate – and I can here do no more than illustrate – the lack of 
engagement with defences of speculative philosophy. Speculative philosophy was most 
often objected to on the ground that it concerns what is beyond any possible empirical 
evidence and rests on purported synthetic a priori knowledge (see, e.g., Ayer (1934), Carnap 
(1935, ch. 1), Ryle (1937), Reichenbach (1951, ch. 18) and Hampshire (1960)). As speculative 
responses make clear, this objection ignores many speculative philosophers’ explicit 
commitment to fallibilistic forms of empiricism (see, e.g., Whitehead (1929), Stedman 
(1938), Pepper (1942), Emmet (1946) and Hahn (1952)). Some of speculative philosophy’s 
critics acknowledged that empirical evidence bears upon it, but denied it any value qua 
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search for truth. Stace is an example; he held that the claims of speculative philosophy “are 
probably bad, poor, amateurish science” (1943, p. 124). Reichenbach (1951) argues that 
speculative philosophy makes use of superficial analogies and that these lead to pseudo-
explanations (1951, ch. 2). Proponents of this objection do not appear to engage with their 
targets. Stace provides no argument for his assertion. Reichenbach, in turn, ignores all 
twentieth-century speculative philosophy, including book-length speculative work about 
when analogy can legitimately be used in philosophy (e.g., Pepper (1942), Emmet (1946)) 
and speculative use of hypothetico-deductive inference alongside analogy and other forms 
of ampliative reasoning (e.g., Whitehead (1929), Stedman (1938) and Pepper (1942)).  
Of course, arguments for specific critical approaches to philosophy as well as the 
application of such approaches in trying to address long-standing philosophical issues might 
be thought indirectly to undermine speculative philosophy. For instance, in making his case 
for logical empiricism, Reichenbach claims that it resolved many traditional philosophical 
issues, from the problem of induction to the issue of the cognitive status of ethical claims 
(1951, p. 307). But, as I noted with regard to discussions of ordinary language philosophy in 
JoP, and as is reflected in the short lives of logical positivism and logical empiricism, specific 
critical proposals for resolving philosophical issues, as well as which critical approach was 
the right approach for philosophy, were hotly disputed, even among analytic philosophers. 
Here too, on the face of things, no sufficiently strong case against speculative philosophy 
appears to have been made. Indeed, the absence of such a case is independently plausible. 
Katzav and Vaesen argue (2017b) that we still do not have a good case for mainstream 
approaches to philosophy and that this is recognised by many inheritors of the analytic 
tradition. 
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5. The nature of analytic philosophy (1925-1969) 
Section 4 focused primarily on the emergence and management of analytic philosophy in 
Britain and America during the period 1925-1969. I now focus on the nature of analytic 
philosophy during this period. Katzav and Vaesen’s documentation (2017a and 2017b) of 
how Mind and PR became analytic journals shows the existence of institutionalised 
opposition to speculative philosophy from as early as 1925; the evidence is that speculative 
philosophy was a major part of what came to be excluded from these journals when they 
were taken over by editors identified as analytic philosophers. In sections 3 and 4, we saw 
that the later takeovers of JoP and PQ were similar occasions for the exclusion of speculative 
philosophy. My more preliminary examination of Analysis, PS and APQ suggests that they 
were similarly disposed; indeed, Analysis’ founding policy statement (Vol. 1(1)) is an 
extremely clear statement of its commitment to critical philosophy. I have found no cases 
during the period 1925-1969 in which a journal run by analytic philosophers was open to 
speculative philosophy. This supports the characterisation of analytic philosophy during the 
period 1925-1969 as a form of philosophy that, at an institutional level, exerted a form of 
control over its rivals that bypassed discussion. Plausibly, as we have seen, the reason for 
this sectarian behaviour was a commitment, again at the institutional level, to the view that 
philosophy should be critical in its approach. 
 My characterisation of JoP’s 1950s and 1960s contents, especially of how 
phenomenology and existentialism were excluded from the journal, also allows me to say 
something about the species of critical philosophy that analytic philosophy was. The 
characterisation suggests that analytic philosophy was at the time a form of critical 
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philosophy that excluded (at least) making central use of detailed characterisations of 
experience in addressing philosophical problems. This fits well not only with the absence of 
sustained phenomenological description from other analytic journals during the years at 
hand, but also with what Katzav and Vaesen (2017b, p. 3) tell us about Mind; what was 
excluded from its pages in the mid-1920s included philosophical psychology, and 
philosophical psychology shared with phenomenology and existentialism an emphasis on 
the detailed characterization of experience as well as the influence of Franz Brentano (van 
der Schaar 2013). An interesting question, which cannot be addressed here, is to what 
extent analytic philosophy might, during the period at hand, be further specified by its 
exclusion of forms of critical philosophy other than those for which the detailed 
characterisation of experience was central. Another question which cannot be addressed 
here is whether, as suggested by earlier work on PR (Katzav and Vaesen 2017a), analytic 
philosophy was also characterised by a certain attitude towards normative issues. 
The relatively pluralistic contents of Mind, PR, JoP, PPR and PQ prior to their 
takeover by analytic philosophers suggests that, at an institutional level, speculative 
philosophy was not, during the period under consideration and if only in America and 
Britain, sectarian in the way that analytic philosophy was. Even PPR under Farber, who was, 
recall, a phenomenologist of the critical variety, was a relatively pluralist journal. To be sure, 
other critical philosophers in America (see, e.g., Randall Jr. (1956) on the logical positivists 
and recall Cumming) may well have shared the sectarian attitude institutionalised by 
analytic philosophers, but only analytic philosophers appear to have institutionalised this 
attitude in a regular and effective way. 
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 There is a straightforward connection between a commitment to critical philosophy 
and sectarianism about philosophy. If philosophy should be critical, then philosophy should 
aim to avoid making its own substantive claims about the world and its inhabitants; 
philosophy should try to avoid straying beyond established opinion. Speculative philosophy, 
by contrast, is not committed to the view that critical philosophy should be avoided. On the 
contrary, examining the limits of established opinion would seem to be a natural, or even 
unavoidable, part of trying to go beyond it. Indeed, Grace de Laguna (1951) argues that 
twentieth-century speculative philosophy is, to a substantial extent, a reaction to twentieth-
century critical philosophy. 
 Of course, the extent to which a commitment to a specific critical philosophical 
approach will lead to sectarianism depends on the strength of the commitment and on 
available opportunities for controlling alternative approaches. A strong degree of 
commitment, along with appropriate opportunities, are plausibly needed to explain the 
sectarian practices we have been observing. A tentative or hedged commitment to critical 
philosophy, it would seem, would allow, or even require, the survival of speculative 
philosophy. 
Further, the conjunction of the high institutional confidence in critical philosophy 
with the already noted apparent absence of sufficiently strong arguments against 
speculative philosophy suggests that analytic philosophy can perhaps be further 
characterised as a form of dogmatism, where dogmatism is here understood to involve a 
degree of commitment to a position that goes beyond what is justified by evidence or 
argumentation. Deciding to what extent such a characterisation is justified requires, 
however, further examination of the case for critical philosophy. 
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6. Concluding discussion 
We have seen that, during the period 1925-1969, control of generalist journals in America 
and Britain was systematically used to marginalise speculative philosophy and other rivals to 
a relatively narrow, critical approach to philosophy, one standardly called ‘analytic 
philosophy’. This suggested a view of the nature of analytic philosophy at the time, one 
according to which it was, at the institutional level, a sectarian, possibly dogmatic, form of 
critical philosophy. My case here is thus in tension with views according to which analytic 
philosophy never involved agreement about fundamental principles (e.g., Preston 2017, p. 
4) and in the spirit of views according to which philosophical approach did, in some sense, 
unify analytic philosophy (e.g., Beaney 2013a).  
 We have also seen that the role of one candidate external influence on Analytic 
philosophy’s growth, i.e., McCarthyism, should be downplayed, something that is in tension 
with the picture of this growth provided by McCumber (2001 and 2016) and Reisch (2005). 
Nevertheless, the control of generalist philosophy journals in America and Britain, perhaps 
alongside control of key philosophy departments, plausibly played an important role in 
explaining the growth of analytic philosophy. Thus, the fundamental shift towards critical 
philosophy that came with analytic philosophy was substantially externally driven. Indeed, it 
was, on the face of things, not adequately justified. These conclusions are compatible with 
their being important internal drivers behind the growth of analytic philosophy, including 
with this growth being facilitated by an affinity between British and American philosophy 
and/or by the philosophical merits of analytic philosophy (for such views see, e.g., Kuklick 
(2006), Soames (2008), Misak (2013) and Beaney (2013b)). Nevertheless, my conclusions do 
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mean that the growth of analytic philosophy was not, at bottom, a matter of mutual 
understanding across the Atlantic or good philosophy. 
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Appendix I:  
Classification of JoP papers published in 1961 and 1962, and of select JoP papers published in 
1963-1965. 
 Critical Speculative 
(Phenomenology 
and 
existentialism in 
bold) 
History and 
biography 
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 Analytic Phenomen
ology and 
existentialis
m 
Other    
1961 
(Vol. 58) 
 
R. H. 
Weingartner (2), 
R. E. Gahringer 
(2), J. Jarvis (3), 
O. K. Bouwsma 
(6), A. F. Holmes 
(8), J. F. Ross (10), 
H. Tennessen 
(10), C. Wellman 
(11), W. E. 
Kennick (12), P. P. 
Hallie (13), P. F. 
Strawson (15). 
M. Mothersill 
(16), N. R. 
Hanson (17), C. 
Hartshorne (17), 
G. Maxwell & H. 
Feigl (18), M. 
Thompson (18), 
J. Jarvis (20), P. 
A. 
Gurwitsch 
(21)  
R. J. 
Bernstein 
(1), 
P. O. 
Kristeller 
(4), L. 
Chiaraviglio 
(19), H. 
Leblanc 
(19) 
G. Kennedy (1), 
K. H. Potter (3), 
H. L. Parsons (5), 
C. B. Downes (5), 
B. Suits (7), S. M. 
Eames (7), H. S. 
Broudy (9), C. 
Lord (12), G. L. 
Kline (13), Z. 
Adamczewski 
(14), P. A. 
Carmichael (14), 
V. C. Chappell 
(19), W. A. 
Christian (19), N. 
Lawrence (19), I. 
Leclerc (19), C. 
R. Hausman 
(20), Q. Lauer 
(21), J. N. Findlay 
C. Lamont 
(1), G. David 
(18), W. E. 
Hocking (19), 
R. Palter (19) 
Kristeller classified 
as critical though 
could be classified 
as speculative. 
 
Leclerc could be 
classified as 
historical. 
 
Findlay classified 
as speculative 
despite influence 
of Wittgenstein. 
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Chisholm (23), B. 
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(25) 
1962 
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L. Linsky (1), M. 
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Thalberg (3), M. 
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Thomas (11), W. 
Sacksteder (12), 
J. W. Yolton (13), 
J. Margolis (13), 
L. Simons (14), A. 
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Rescher (15), T. 
F. Lindley (17), 
M. C. Beardsley 
(18), M. Black 
(19), D. Greunder 
(19), H. N. 
Castañeda (20), 
A. Grünbaum 
(21), N. R. 
Hanson (21), R. 
M. Martin (21), 
A. R. Anderson 
(21), M. C. 
Beardsley (21), S. 
M. McMurrin 
(22), B. O. Smith 
(22), K. S. 
R. Schmitt 
(16), M. 
Farber (16) 
 A. Hofstadter 
(22) 
M. Grene & J. 
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G. R. Morrow 
(6), L. 
Edelstein (6), 
F. P. Clark 
(23), A. B. 
Wolter (23), 
J. F. Ross (23)  
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Donnellan (22), 
H. Putnam (22), 
R. Wells (23), W. 
P. Alston (23), D. 
C. Williams (23), 
W. Barrett (23), 
P. Benacerraf 
(24), R. F. 
Tredwell (25), R. 
J. Richman (26) 
1963 
(Vol. 60) 
Non-
analytic, 
non-
historical 
only 
 B. 
O’Shaughn
essy (14) 
K. Stern 
(24) 
J. H. Randall, Jr. 
(2), M. Mayeroff 
(6), I. Murphree 
(12), C. 
Hartshorne (21), 
J. Wild (22), H. L. 
Dreyfus (22) 
  
1964 
(Vol. 61). 
Non-
analytic, 
non-
historical 
only 
 J. 
Stambaugh 
(9) 
H. Smith 
(18) 
D. Cory (1), C. 
Hartshorne (1), 
J. Lachs (1),  
  
1965 
(Vol. 62) 
Non-
analytic, 
non-
historical 
only 
 A. 
Hofstadter 
(7) 
 C. Lamont (2)  Hofstadter uses 
linguistic analysis 
but classified 
under 
phenomenology 
and existentialism 
due to 
Heideggerian 
focus. 
 
 
